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Many analysts have suggested that population aging will adversely aﬀect
the assets of baby boomers when they retire. They argue that when a large
population cohort is working and accumulating resources for retirement,
their demand for wealth is high, and this raises the price of ﬁnancial assets
and other stores of wealth. Conversely, when a large cohort retires, the ar-
gument suggests that cohort members are likely to sell their assets to ﬁ-
nance consumption and thereby to drive down asset prices. This argument
suggests that the rapidly increasing population of older people in the
United States and around the world might lead to lower returns in ﬁnan-
cial markets in the decades ahead.
This chapter examines the eﬀect of population aging on the demand for
ﬁnancial assets in retirement saving plans, particularly deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) plans, in the United States. It is part of a larger project that aims to
evaluate the potential empirical importance of demographic trends on ﬁ-
nancial market returns in the United States. Our analysis focuses on re-
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on Retirement Research for their comments.tirement saving programs because the future eﬀect of demographic trends
on ﬁnancial asset demand is likely to be most pronounced in asset holdings
in retirement saving plans. The inﬂows and outﬂows from these plans, par-
ticularly DB plans, are sensitive to demographic trends. Thus, a key step-
ping stone in understanding the eﬀect of population age structure on asset
returns is forecasting the eﬀect of demographic trends on the net cash ﬂows
to retirement saving plans and the stock of assets in these plans.
Over the past two and a half decades, there has been a fundamental
change in saving for retirement in the United States. There has been a rapid
shift from saving through employer-managed DB pensions to deﬁned con-
tribution (DC) retirement saving plans that are largely controlled by em-
ployees. Just two or three decades ago, employer-provided DB plans were
the primary means of saving for retirement in the United States. But since
that time, 401(k) and other personal retirement accounts have become the
principal form of retirement saving in the private sector. Deﬁned beneﬁt
plans have remained an important form of retirement saving for federal
employees and for state and local employees, although even for these em-
ployees, personal retirement accounts are becoming increasingly impor-
tant. More than 80 percent of private retirement plan contributions in 2000
and 2001 were to 401(k) and other personal accounts. Contributions to
personal retirement plans accounted for only 12 percent of total contribu-
tions to federal pension plans in 2000, but had increased to 17 percent by
2004. Thus, to understand the eﬀect of demographic trends on the demand
for retirement assets in the coming decades, it is important to evaluate the
likely ﬂows into and out of both 401(k) and DB plans.
In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2008), we described the rise of 401(k) plans
and the implications of this rise for the ﬂow of assets into and out of 401(k)
plans over the next four decades. In this chapter we describe the decline in
DB plans and assess its implications for the ﬂow of assets into and out of
DB plans over the next four decades. We then bring together projections of
net pension ﬂows to both DB and DC plans. Schieber and Shoven (1997)
consider the implications of population aging for private pension fund sav-
ing and project saving as a percent of payrolls. Their projection method
diﬀers from ours, and it does not consider the rising importance of self-
directed DC plans.
There is a substantial and growing literature on the link between popu-
lation age structure and returns in ﬁnancial markets. The U.S. Government
Accountability Oﬃce (2006) provides a recent review of related research.
Several studies have used an overlapping-generations framework to ex-
plore the theoretical eﬀects of a transitory increase in the population
growth rate, a “baby boom,” on the equilibrium rate of return. These stud-
ies, while based on stylized models, oﬀer valuable insight on the direction
of asset market eﬀects. Other research has taken a more empirical ap-
334 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wiseproach and explored the reduced from relationship between summary
measures of demographic structure and the returns to investors holding
bonds and stocks. The existing ﬁndings, illustrated, for example, in Brooks
(2002), Geanakoplos, Magill, and Quinzii (2004), and Poterba (2005), span
a range of diﬀerent potential outcomes. Most of the existing work adopts
a closed-economy approach, either studying how a baby boom in a single
economy will aﬀect returns in that economy or examining the correlation
between a nation’s population structure and ﬁnancial market returns in
that nation. Recent analyses, however, such as Boersch-Supan, Ludwig,
and Winter (2005) and Krueger and Ludwig (2006), move beyond this set-
ting and examine how demographic trends aﬀect international capital
ﬂows as well as domestic asset markets.
Very few studies have used household-level data on asset accumulation
to project future asset demand. This chapter on DB plans and our com-
panion paper on 401(k) plans begin with a disaggregated analysis of cur-
rent asset ﬂows in and out of the pension system and use these ﬂows as a
base to project pension assets in future years. These projections are a crit-
ical input to assessing the eﬀect of demographically induced asset ﬂows on
market rates of return.
This chapter is divided into ten sections. In the ﬁrst, we present a cohort
description of the decline in the participation rate of employed persons in
DB plans over the past two decades. Then we describe a series of analyses
that provide the basis for projections of future assets in DB plans. We be-
gin section 10.2 with a cohort description of the dollar amount of pension
beneﬁts received by persons over age ﬁfty-ﬁve, and we develop projections
of DB beneﬁts in the future. In section 10.3, we present a parallel cohort
description of the probability of receipt of DB beneﬁts by persons over the
age of ﬁfty-ﬁve. In section 10.4, we return to the estimation of DB partici-
pation during the working years. While in the ﬁrst section we considered
DB participation proﬁles for employed persons, here we consider analo-
gous proﬁles for all persons in the population. The estimates obtained in
this section are used to supplement the estimates obtained in section 10.3
to project beneﬁts after retirement for all persons in the population. In sec-
tion 10.5, we combine the information described in the previous three sec-
tions to develop projections of the total value of DB beneﬁts in future
years. Section 10.6 presents projections of DB pension wealth for cohorts
retiring between 1982 and 2040 and, for each cohort, compares DB wealth
to projected 401(k) assets from Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2008). In section
10.7, we consider projections of the total value of assets in DB trust funds.
Section 10.8 brings together projections for both DB and 401(k) plans to
explore the ﬂow in and out of the pension system as a whole. It is the
change in the assets in DB trust funds combined with the change in the as-
sets in personal retirement accounts that may aﬀect the rate of return on
The Decline of Deﬁned Beneﬁt Retirement Plans and Asset Flows 335the investments of future generations of retirees. In section 10.9, we discuss
what our projections imply for the relative change in asset demand in the
future. Section 10.10 summarizes our ﬁndings.
10.1 Participation of Employees in DB Plans
Deﬁned beneﬁt participation data were obtained form the several waves
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years
1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2003. Our analysis here and in sub-
sequent sections is based on organization of the data by cohort. We some-
times deﬁne cohorts by the age of the cohort in 1984 and sometimes by the
year in which the cohort attains age sixty-ﬁve. When referring to the cohort
age in 1984, the age is proceeded by “C.” When referring to the year the co-
hort attains age sixty-ﬁve, the year is proceeded by “A.” Thus, C65 and
A1984 identify the same cohort.
To project DB participation in the future, or to predict DB participation
in earlier years, we must make projections beyond the range of the ob-
served SIPP data. The cohorts for which data are observed, and the ages
for which data are observed, are shown in table 10.1. The table also shows
the cohorts, and ages, for which projections are made. Data for all years
spanned by the SIPP surveys are available for cohorts C25 through C45.
Data for some of the survey years are available for cohorts C9 to C24 and
for cohorts C46 to C64. The cohorts for which some SIPP data are avail-
able are noted in bold in the table.
Figure 10.1 shows the data for selected cohorts. It is clear that the DB
participation rate of employed persons declined consistently with succes-
sively younger cohorts. For example, at age forty-ﬁve, the participation
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Table 10.1 Cohorts, observed data, and projected data for deﬁned beneﬁt
participation given employment
Cohort deﬁned Cohort  deﬁned by year
by age in 1984 Age in 1984 Age in 2003 age 65 is attained
C-1  1 18 A2050
C0 0 19 A2049
C1 1 20 A2048
C8 8 27 A2041
C9 9 28 A2040
C25 25 43 A2024
C45 45 63 A2004
C64 64 83 A1985
C65 65 84 A1984
C100 100 119 A1949rate of those who attained age forty-ﬁve in 1984, the C45 cohort, was about
43 percent. But the participation rate of the C27 cohort, which attained age
forty-ﬁve in 2002, was about 29 percent. Comparisons at other ages show
similar diﬀerences.
Not only is there a cohort eﬀect, with younger cohorts having a succes-
sively lower participation rate at all ages, but there is also a within-cohort
decline in the participation rate with age. The within-cohort decline with
age for older cohorts is likely explained in part by retirement. Deﬁned ben-
eﬁt plans typically provide incentives to retire early, and DB participants,
on average, retire earlier than persons without these plans; some par-
ticipants may retire as early as age ﬁfty-ﬁve. But even for younger co-
horts, there is typically a within-cohort decline in DB participation rates
with age.
For comparison, similar cohort data for 401(k) plans and other personal
retirement plans are shown in ﬁgure 10.2. At age forty-ﬁve, the 401(k) par-
ticipation rate of the cohort that attained age forty-ﬁve in 1984 was only 8
percent. But the participation rate of the cohort that attained age forty-ﬁve
in 2002 was about 47 percent.
Figure 10.3 shows DB participation rates for every other cohort. Again,
it is clear that with few exceptions, the data show consistently lower par-
ticipation rates with successively younger cohorts.
Because we rely on the SIPP data, we have compared the SIPP partici-
pation rates by age with rates by age from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The comparisons are shown in table 10.2. The SIPP data pertain to
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Fig. 10.1 DB participation rate of employed persons, selected cohortsall employees age twenty-ﬁve to sixty-four, including persons employed in
private-sector ﬁrms, self-employed persons, and persons in federal, state,
or local government employment. The BLS data pertain to employees of
all ages, but exclude the self-employed and federal employees. Thus, the
comparison is imperfect. For the four years that a direct comparison can
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Fig. 10.2 401(k) participation rate of employed persons, selected cohorts
Fig. 10.3 DB participation rate for employees, every other cohortbe made, the data show that the SIPP estimates are below the BLS esti-
mates as might be expected given the diﬀerences in the coverage of the two
series. All three series show the same downward trend over time.
The cohort data shown in ﬁgures 10.1 and 10.2 allow comparisons be-
tween the participation rates of some cohorts at a given age—say forty-
ﬁve—but these data alone do not allow comparisons that include very
young or very old cohorts who were not represented in the SIPP data. For
example, we cannot compare the participation rates at age forty-ﬁve of co-
horts C55 and C13—marked in ﬁgure 10.1. To do this, we need to project
forward the future participation rates of younger cohorts at older ages and
project backward the participation rates of older cohorts at younger ages.
We have made these projections by ﬁtting the cohort data and then us-
ing the estimated parameters to predict outside range of the observed data,
while relying on estimated cohort eﬀects. The detailed estimates are not
shown in the chapter but are available on request. The data represented in
ﬁgures 10.1 to 10.3 are based on employed persons. As explained in the fol-
lowing, we need to develop estimates based on the percent of all persons
who are covered by a DB plan. These projections are explained in section
10.4.
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Table 10.2 Deﬁned beneﬁt participation rate by age, based on Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for
employed persons aged 25–64








1991 34 41 34.9
1992 32 40











Source: Wiatrowski (2005).10.2 DB Pension Beneﬁts of Recipients and Projections
We now begin a series of analyses that provide the basis for projections
of future assets in DB plans. We begin in this section with a cohort de-
scription of the dollar amount of the DB beneﬁts of persons who received
DB beneﬁts at ages over ﬁfty-ﬁve and then describe how we project beneﬁt
amounts in the future. In section 10.3, we present a parallel description of
the percent of older persons that receives DB beneﬁts.
Data on DB beneﬁts received by retirees, like the participation data for
employed persons shown in the preceding, are obtained from SIPP waves
for the years 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2003. And, as with the
participation data, we ﬁrst present a cohort description of the observed
data. We then ﬁt the observed data and use the ﬁtted model to project ben-
eﬁts outside the range of the observed data. Table 10.3 describes the ob-
served data and the cohorts for which data must be projected. We obtain
data on beneﬁts received for persons aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve. Some
SIPP data are available for cohorts C36 to C67. Beneﬁts received for
younger cohorts—C47 to C35—and for older cohorts—C68 to C102—
must be projected. The numerical amounts table 10.3 show monthly pen-
sion beneﬁts observed in the SIPP. An “X” indicates that a pension bene-
ﬁt amount is not observed in the SIPP and that the amount must be
estimated. Partial data are available for cohorts C36 to C48. Cohort C36
was age ﬁfty-ﬁve in 2003, and thus SIPP data are available for only one year
(2003) for this cohort. For successively older cohorts through C48, data are
available for more years. Beginning with cohort C55—that was age ﬁfty-
ﬁve in 1984—data are available for all seven years that the SIPP data are
available. Complete data are available for all cohorts through C66, that was
age eighty-ﬁve in 2003, the last year of SIPP data. For cohorts C67 through
C85, successively fewer years of data are observed in the SIPP. Cohort C85
was age eighty-ﬁve in 1984, and thus SIPP data for this cohort are only
available in that year.
By ﬁtting the observed data on the receipt of beneﬁts, we can interpolate
values for years between the years for which data are available. In addition,
the model used to ﬁt the data can be used to project beneﬁts for cohorts
outside of the range of the observed data. The cohorts and ages for which
such projections must be made are indicated by “X” in table 10.3. We proj-
ect beneﬁts received back to A1947 because members of this cohort attain
age 100 in 1982 and may thus be receiving beneﬁts in the initial year (1982)
of our DB asset projections. We project beneﬁts received forward as far out
as 2096 to allow calculation of employer DB pension liabilities, described
in the following.
Figure 10.4 shows the actual data for the monthly level of beneﬁts for se-
lected cohorts. The data are for all persons age ﬁfty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve and
include persons who are receiving beneﬁts from federal or state and local re-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Xtirement programs, as well as from private-sector pensions plans.1 Two fea-
tures of the data stand out. One is that beneﬁts of younger cohorts are much
greater than beneﬁts of older cohorts. For example, the beneﬁt at age sixty
for the cohort that attained that age in 1984 was about $600 per month; the
beneﬁt for the cohort that attained age sixty in 2003 was about $1,600 per
month (circled in the ﬁgure). The other feature of the data is that within-
cohort beneﬁts increase with age. In part this results from the indexing of
beneﬁts from some DB plans, especially federal and state and local plans.
In addition, private employer plans, which are typically not indexed, some-
times grant cost-of-living increases on an ad hoc basis after retirement.
We ﬁt the cohort data on beneﬁts with the following speciﬁcation:




Here, B is the dollar amount of monthly pension beneﬁts, and cohorts are
deﬁned by the year the cohort attains age sixty-ﬁve—the Cc indicator vari-
able—and the variables A1 through A5 specify age as piecewise linear with
break points at sixty, sixty-ﬁve, seventy, and seventy-ﬁve.
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Fig. 10.4 DB beneﬁt receipt for selected cohorts
1. The level of DB beneﬁts received is derived from SIPP data on receipt of income from the
following sources: pension from company or union; federal civil service or other federal civil-
ian employee pension; U.S. military retirement pay; National Guard or reserve forces retire-
ment; state government pension; local government pension; U.S. government railroad retire-
ment; veterans compensation or pension. We have assumed that all monthly income received
from these sources is DB income although it is possible that withdrawals of DC assets may be
included.The parameter estimates are presented in table 10A.1. We use the esti-
mated parameters from this speciﬁcation to project beneﬁts forward for
the younger cohorts and to project beneﬁts backward for the older cohorts.
There are at least two years of observed SIPP data for cohorts as old as
A1970 (observed at age seventy-nine in 1984 and age eighty-two in 1987).
There are not enough SIPP observations to reliably estimate cohort eﬀects
for cohorts younger than A2012. We obtain beneﬁt estimates for cohorts
attaining age sixty-ﬁve prior to 1970 by shifting the A1970 beneﬁt proﬁle
by according to the Social Security Administration’s average wage index.
That is, we assume that the pension beneﬁt growth paralleled wage growth
between 1949 and 1970. We only use beneﬁts received in calendar years
1982 and later. For cohort A1970, for example, we use estimates beginning
at age seventy-seven, in 1982. We use the wage index to estimate cohort
eﬀects for cohorts that retired before 1970, but we only project for older
ages (after 1982) for each cohort.
The more important projections are for cohorts younger than the A2012
cohort. Which speciﬁc extrapolation to use, however, is open to question.
The following ﬁgures show some of the relevant data. Figure 10.5shows the
estimated cohort eﬀects for cohorts A1982 to A2012. An exponential ﬁt
over all of the cohort eﬀects—with an R2 value of 0.99—suggests that, on
average, beneﬁts increase by 4.5 percent with each successively younger
cohort. But the ﬁgure also shows that the rate of change in the cohort
eﬀects may have declined over time. The estimated rate of change was only
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Fig. 10.5 Estimated cohort eﬀect from beneﬁt regression by year cohort attains
age 652.94 percent for the A2003 to A2012 cohorts. (The cohort eﬀects for these
years are circled in ﬁgure 10.5.)
Figure 10.6shows a diﬀerent view of the data, beginning with the change
in the estimated cohort eﬀects from one cohort to the next younger cohort.
It is clear that the percent changes vary substantially from one cohort to
the next. The ﬁgure also shows the four-year moving average of these
changes. It is clear from the moving average that the average change from
one cohort to the next younger cohort was close to 5 percent over most of
the period but declined to close to 1 percent around 2006. The ﬁgure also
shows the Social Security average wage index over the years 1982 to 2003.
These data suggest a noticeable correspondence between the four-year
moving average of the change in the estimated cohort eﬀects and the wage
index. After 2003, the SSA assumes a wage increase of 3.9 percent annu-
ally. On average, the change in the cohort eﬀects was only about 2.9 percent
over these years.
Based on these data, we have assumed that for younger cohorts beneﬁts
will increase at 3.9 percent for each successively younger cohort, the same
as the SSA intermediate assumption for the average wage index. Figure
10.7shows beneﬁt proﬁles for selected cohorts, including projected proﬁles
for cohorts A2013 to A2050 (dashed lines in the ﬁgure) and the ﬁtted co-
hort proﬁles for cohorts A1974 to A2012 (solid lines). Proﬁles for cohorts
older than A1974 are not shown (these cohorts are relatively unimportant
because our projection of DB assets begins in 1982). All proﬁles are in year
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Fig. 10.6 Percent change in estimated beneﬁt cohort eﬀect versus the Social Secu-
rity average wage index (AWI), by year cohort attains age 652000 dollars. The beneﬁt model parameter estimates show that cohort age
proﬁles in current dollars are slightly upward sloping, perhaps due to the
indexing of government pensions and ad hoc cost-of-living increases for
other pension beneﬁts. The age proﬁles in 2000 dollars in the ﬁgure slope
downward, however.
10.3 Receipt of DB Pension Beneﬁts
In the previous section, we discussed the dollar amount of the DB bene-
ﬁts of persons who received DB beneﬁts at each age. To obtain an estimate
of the total dollar amount of DB beneﬁts, we need also to determine the
proportion of persons who receive beneﬁts at each age. We now consider
the probability of beneﬁt receipt.
We begin with cohort data on the percentage of persons receiving DB
beneﬁts at each age. Figure 10.8shows data for selected cohorts (essentially
every other cohort). Two features of the data are evident. First, the cohort
eﬀects are rather small, with the exception of the older cohorts. In other
words, the proﬁle of beneﬁt receipt by age is about the same for all the co-
horts represented in the SIPP data (with the exception of the oldest co-
horts). For example, among cohorts observed at age seventy, the probabil-
ity of receipt of beneﬁts ranges from about 45 percent for the youngest
cohort to 49 percent for the oldest cohort. Second, the age at which the
maximum percent of persons receive beneﬁts is about seventy.
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Fig. 10.7 Fitted and projected beneﬁt proﬁles, selected cohorts (in year 
2000 dollars)
Notes: Last ﬁtted proﬁle graphed is A2012. First projected proﬁle graphed is A2016.To project beneﬁt receipt for future (younger) cohorts that are not ob-
served in the SIPP data, we assume the age-beneﬁt-receipt proﬁle shown in
ﬁgure 10.8 continues to apply. However, we allow this proﬁle to shift
(downward) for younger cohorts. We ﬁrst estimate age and cohort eﬀects
for cohorts observed in the SIPP. Then we predict beneﬁts for younger co-
horts, assuming that—except for the cohort eﬀects—the age-beneﬁt-
receipt proﬁle in the same for younger cohorts as it has been for older co-
horts observed in the SIPP.
We ﬁt the beneﬁt receipt data using a probit model and a piecewise lin-
ear speciﬁcation for age like the one presented in the preceding. The
sample consists of the same persons age ﬁfty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve used in the
previous section to estimate the level of beneﬁts. The speciﬁcation is
Rac    a 60A1    60 a 65A2    65 a 70A3    70 a 75A4




where Ris the receipt of beneﬁts, and cohorts are deﬁned by the age the co-
hort attains age sixty-ﬁve. The estimated cohort eﬀects are shown in table
10A.2. Figure 10.9 shows that the estimated cohort eﬀects are essentially
unchanged for cohorts that attained age sixty-ﬁve between 1982 and 2003.
The cohort eﬀects were smaller but increasing for cohorts that attained age
sixty-ﬁve between 1969 and 1981. The larger cohort eﬀects for cohorts that
attained age sixty-ﬁve in 2004 and later years are based on very few SIPP
observations and pertain only to persons who were receiving beneﬁts at
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Fig. 10.8 Percent receiving DB beneﬁts, selected cohortsyoung ages. For example, data for the A2004 cohort are only observed
through age sixty-four and for the A2012 cohort only for age ﬁfty-six.
Because we cannot reliably estimate cohort eﬀects for cohorts younger
that A2003, we assume that the beneﬁt receipt rates of successively
younger cohorts follow the same pattern as the DB participation rates of
these same cohorts when they were in the labor force. The assumption is
that if fewer persons in a particular cohort participated when young, then
fewer persons will receive beneﬁts after retirement. We do this by ﬁrst cal-
culating the maximum DB participation rate over ages twenty-ﬁve to sixty-
four for each cohort. We use this maximum rate to predict beneﬁt receipt
when the cohort is retired. We use cohort-to-cohort changes in the maxi-
mum DB participation rate, and the 2003 ﬁtted age-beneﬁt receipt proﬁle,
to project beneﬁt receipt for cohorts A2004 through A2060. Before pre-
senting these projections, we describe the population-based DB participa-
tion rates that are required to make the calculations.
10.4 Population-Based DB Participation Rates
The previous two sections have developed projections for the level of
beneﬁts (conditional on receipt) and for the probability of receiving DB
beneﬁts after retirement. As noted in the preceding, the probability of re-
ceiving beneﬁts cannot reliably be estimated for cohorts retiring after 2003
using the SIPP data. These cohorts are not observed after age ﬁfty-ﬁve in
the data. However, these same cohorts are observed at younger ages when
they are in the labor force. We infer the probability of beneﬁt receipt after
The Decline of Deﬁned Beneﬁt Retirement Plans and Asset Flows 347
Fig. 10.9 Cohort eﬀects for the receipt of beneﬁts by year attained age 65retirement from the DB participation rates of these cohorts when they were
in the labor force. This section develops estimates of DB participation that
are closely related to those presented in section 10.1 for employed persons.
Here we consider the participation rate of all persons in the population be-
cause we will use our estimates to infer beneﬁt receipt for all retirees (not
just those who were employed).
The employment-based participation rates and the population-based
rates can diﬀer substantially. To see this, note that the percent of popula-
tion that participates in a DB plan at age a is given by
   a
    a
Pr[DBa⏐Ea],
where E is employment, and P is population, and a denotes age. Table 10.4
shows the probability that a person has a DB plan given that the person is
employed and the employment to population ratio for each year of SIPP
data available between 1984 and 2003. These data show that the last term,
Pr[DBa⏐Ea], has declined between 1984 and 2003, but the fraction of the
population employed (E/P)a increased between 1984 and 1998 but fell in
2003.2 The percentage of employed persons participating in a DB plan de-
clined from 39.4 percent to 29.7 percent over this period.
The overall eﬀect of these trends is that cohort eﬀects are smaller when
allpersons are used as the base than when employedpersons are used as the
base. This can be seen by comparing ﬁgure 10.1 with ﬁgure 10.10, which
are shown together in the following. For example, at age forty-ﬁve, the
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Table 10.4 Deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) participation and ratio of employment to
population, all persons aged 25–64
DB participation  Employment to  (DB participation)  
Year given employment population ratio (Employment to population ratio)
1984 39.4 0.752 29.6
1987 36.8 0.767 28.2
1991 34.9 0.778 27.2
1993 34.2 0.771 26.4
1995 31.6 0.777 24.6
1998 29.9 0.778 23.3
2003 29.7 0.763 22.7
Source: Authors calculations from Survey of Income and Program Participation Surveys.
2. The employment to population ratio for persons sixteen and over reported by the BLS
shows an increase from 59.5 percent in 1984 to 64.1 percent in 1998 and then a drop to 62.3
percent in 2003. The SIPP data we use are for ages twenty-ﬁve to sixty-four.Fig. 10.10 DB participation rate for all persons, selected cohorts
Fig. 10.1 DB participation rate of employed persons, selected cohortscentage points based on those employed but only about 10 percentage
points based on all persons.
As with the participation based on employed persons, we ﬁt the popula-
tion-based participation data using a probit model with this speciﬁcation:
DB(Pop)ac    a 30A1    30 a 35A2    35 a 40A3    40 a 45A4    45 a 50A5




The estimated cohort eﬀects from this speciﬁcation (deﬁned here by age in
1984) are shown in ﬁgure 10.11, while the complete estimation results are
shown in table 10A.3.
Selected ﬁtted cohort proﬁles together with the corresponding cohort
data are shown in ﬁgure 10.12. We judge that the ﬁtted proﬁles represent
the data quite well. We then use the model estimates to predict population-
based participation rates at all ages (twenty-ﬁve to sixty-four) for each of
the cohorts for which we are able to estimate cohort eﬀects. These predic-
tions are shown (as solid lines) in ﬁgure 10.13 for selected cohorts. We pre-
dict at all ages for each cohort because we want to determine the age at
which the participation rate is at a maximum for each of the cohorts. The
use of this calculation is explained in the following. Predicting at older ages
for the younger cohorts suggests that by the time these cohorts reach re-
tirement age, their participation in DB plans will be very low. For example,
based on these predictions, the DB participation rate of persons in the C11
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Fig. 10.11 DB participation for all persons, estimated cohort eﬀects, by year at-
tained age 65cohort will be only 8.8 percent when that cohort attains age ﬁfty-ﬁve (co-
hort C11 attains age sixty-ﬁve in 2038).
The youngest cohort in the SIPP data is A2040. For later use, we will
need cohorts as young as A2050. Figure 10.11 shows that the decline in the
estimated cohort eﬀects, with successively younger cohorts, is close to lin-
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Fig. 10.12 Actual versus ﬁtted DB participation proﬁles for selected cohorts 
(all persons)
Fig. 10.13 DB participation for all persons, projections to younger cohorts
(dotted), (2.1% decline for cohorts that retire 2040–2050)ear—at –0.017 per cohort. Thus, we extrapolate the estimated cohort
eﬀects linearly to project the eﬀects for younger cohorts. This extrapola-
tion yields proﬁles for the younger cohorts shown as dashed lines in ﬁgure
10.13.
All of the projections we make are subject to substantial uncertainty.
These projection in particular raise the prospect that the past trend may
not be a good predictor of the future trend. For example, several large com-
panies have recently announced that traditional DB pension plans would
be phased out. Other companies could follow this lead more rapidly than
our projections suggest. This would lead to a faster-than-projected decline
in DB assets.
10.5 Projected Beneﬁts Paid
To develop projections of the total value of beneﬁts paid by DB plans,
we combine estimates of the level of beneﬁts in section 10.2 with estimates
of the probability of beneﬁt receipt in section 10.3. To help to forecast ben-
eﬁt receipt for younger cohorts (retiring after 2003), we use estimates of
DB participation of these younger cohorts during their working ages. In
particular, we use the population-based estimates of DB participation by
cohort discussed in section 10.4 to predict pension receipt after retirement.
The necessary data is set out in table 10.5. We ﬁrst use the estimates of
probability of beneﬁt receipt for cohorts A1982 to A2003 to predict the
percent of each of these cohorts that receives beneﬁts at age seventy (recall
from ﬁgure 10.8 that age seventy is the age at which the maximum percent
of persons receive beneﬁts). As discussed in section 10.3, for these cohorts
there are a suﬃcient number of SIPP observations to obtain reasonably re-
liable estimates of beneﬁt receipt. These probabilities are shown in column
(3) of table 10.5. The probabilities are also graphed in ﬁgure 10.14 for the
years 1982 through 2003.
We next need to project beneﬁts at age seventy for younger cohorts
(A2004 to A2040). To make these projections, we use the population-based
DB participation rates, discussed in section 10.4. From these data, we have
calculated the maximum participation rates, over ages twenty-ﬁve to sixty-
four, for each cohort. These estimates are shown in column (5) of table
10.5. We use the maximum participation rate during working years to pre-
dict the probability of beneﬁt receipt at age seventy for cohorts A2004 and
younger. We assume that the year-to-year percent change in the probabil-
ity of receipt of beneﬁts at age seventy is the same as the year-to-year per-
cent change in the maximum DB participation rate. Thus, for example, the
last cohort for which the receipt probability is observed is A2003 (47.3 per-
cent). We project the 2004 receipt probability by assuming it declines by the
same percentage amount as the maximum participation probability (from
38.6 percent for A2003 to 37.7 percent in 2004). The prediction for 2004,
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Probability receive  Projected 
Age of  beneﬁts at age 70  probability  DB participation
Year cohort  cohort (from beneﬁt receive beneﬁts  maximum (from DB
attains age 65  in 1984  receipt data)  at age 70  participation data)




1985 64 46.5 39.7
1986 63 46.6 42.9
1987 62 48.0 42.1
1988 61 48.3 47.2
1989 60 47.6 45.4
1990 59 49.1 47.6
1991 58 47.9 47.0
1992 57 47.7 45.8
1993 56 47.4 50.9
1994 55 47.7 43.8
1995 54 48.2 44.4
1996 53 47.9 44.2
1997 52 48.0 35.8
1998 51 47.9 39.1
1999 50 47.9 38.4
2000 49 51.4 36.6
2001 48 48.0 35.7
2002 47 47.3 40.5
2003 46 47.3 38.6
2004 45 46.1 37.7
2005 44 41.9 34.2
2006 43 44.9 36.6
2007 42 47.9 39.1
2008 41 45.9 37.5
2009 40 44.5 36.4
2010 39 43.4 35.4
2011 38 44.1 36.0
2012 37 44.6 36.4
2013 36 43.3 35.4
2014 35 40.3 32.9
2015 34 40.9 33.4
2016 33 38.9 31.8
2017 32 36.7 29.9
2018 31 36.3 29.6
2019 30 33.5 27.3
2020 29 33.5 27.4
2021 28 32.1 26.2
2022 27 31.9 26.0
2023 26 31.2 25.5
2024 25 31.9 26.0
2025 24 29.5 24.1
(continued)Table 10.5 (continued)
Probability receive  Projected 
Age of  beneﬁts at age 70  probability  DB participation
Year cohort  cohort (from beneﬁt receive beneﬁts  maximum (from DB
attains age 65  in 1984  receipt data)  at age 70  participation data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2026 23 31.7 25.9
2027 22 28.4 23.1
2028 21 27.5 22.5
2029 20 28.6 23.4
2030 19 27.9 22.7
2031 18 23.9 19.5
2032 17 26.5 21.7
2033 16 23.6 19.3
2034 15 21.9 17.9
2035 14 20.7 16.9
2036 13 21.4 17.4
2037 12 20.6 16.8
2038 11 19.3 15.7
2039 10 20.0 16.3
2040 9 19.5 15.9
Note: DB   deﬁned beneﬁt.
Fig. 10.14 Percent receiving beneﬁts at age 70, by cohort (solid is ﬁtted SIPP esti-
mate, and striped is projected)46.2 percent (shown in column [4]) is 47.3%   (37.7%/38.6%). The same
calculations are continued to project the probability of receiving beneﬁts at
age seventy for cohorts A2004 through A2040. For cohorts younger than
A2040 (not shown in the table) a 2 percent decline is assumed. This is an
extrapolation of the decline for the cohorts A2031 to A2040.
From the percent that receives beneﬁts at age seventy, we predict the per-
cent that receives beneﬁts at each age, as described in section 10.3. These
estimates are shown for selected cohorts in ﬁgure 10.15.
10.6 Present Value of DB Beneﬁts at Sixty-Five
We have projected the average level of the DB beneﬁts of recipients, by
age and cohort, Bac, for cohorts attaining age sixty-ﬁve in the years 1982
through 2050. We have also projected the probability of beneﬁt receipt for
each age and cohort. First, we obtain for each cohort the average present
value (PV) of beneﬁts at age sixty-ﬁve for persons who receiveDB beneﬁts,
given by:
(1) PV(recipients)c,65  ∑
100
a 65  
a
t 65
St,c    ,
where St,c is the cohort-speciﬁc probability of survival to age t conditional
on being alive at t – 1, and r is the discount rate. Second, we calculate the
present value of DB beneﬁts at age 65 for all cohort members, both those
with and those without a DB plan. The expected average beneﬁt received
Ba,c   
(1   r)(a 65)
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Fig. 10.15 Projected percent receiving beneﬁts for selected cohorts attaining age
65 in years 1982 through 2040 (solid is ﬁtted SIPP estimate, and dotted is projected)356 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise
Fig. 10.16 Present value DB beneﬁts at age 65: All persons and persons with a DB
by all persons of age a in cohort c is  B  ac   Pr[beneﬁt receipt]  
[beneﬁtsac⏐beneﬁt receipt]  Bac P ac. Thus the present value of beneﬁts av-
eraged over all persons is given by:
(2) PV(all persons)c,65  ∑
100
a 65  
a
t 65
St,c    .
Figure 10.16graphs both of these present value calculations. The present
value amounts have been converted to constant year 2000 dollars. A real
discount rate of 3 percent and average SSA age-speciﬁc survival probabili-
ties are assumed. For these calculations, pension beneﬁts received prior to
age sixty-ﬁve have been ignored. The top proﬁle shows that the average
present value of DB beneﬁts for persons that receive DB beneﬁts will be
greater for cohorts retiring in the future than for cohorts retiring today. This
is because we assume that nominal beneﬁts increase by 3.9 percent annually,
and the inﬂation rate is 2.8 percent. However, the lower proﬁle shows that
the PV of DB wealth, averaged across all persons, will decline in the future
as fewer persons participate. Indeed, these projections show DB wealth
peaking in 2003 at about $73,000 and falling to about $50,000 by 2020.3
Ba,c   P ac   
(1   r)(a 65)
3. These estimates indicate that in 2000 the average of DB beneﬁts over all persons was
$67,386. Based on HRS data, Johnson, Burman and Kobes (2004), estimate that the mean
present value of employer-sponsored pension income for persons sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine in
2000 was $50,203. Our estimate should be larger than theirs because we include persons of all
ages. In particular, average beneﬁts increase with age because death rates selectively leave in
the sample persons with higher beneﬁts and because of ad hoc cost-of-living increases and in-
dexed beneﬁts in many government plans.For comparison, we show the average present value of 401(k) assets at
age sixty-ﬁve, reported in Poterba, Venti and Wise (2008).4 The compari-
son between the average present value of DB beneﬁts at age sixty-ﬁve and
average 401(k) assets at age sixty-ﬁve is graphed in ﬁgures 10.17 and 10.18
for all persons. The comparisons in ﬁgures 10.19 and 10.20 pertain to per-
sons with plans. Figures 10.17 and 10.19 show 401(k) assets at retirement
assuming that the return on equities in the future will be equal to the his-
torical average. Figures 10.18 and 10.20 show 401(k) assets assuming that
the return on equities in the future will be 300 basis points less than histor-
ical average return.
Assuming historical rates of return, ﬁgure 10.17 shows that average
401(k) assets of all persons reach the average PV of DB beneﬁts of all per-
sons in 2010 when both are about $67,000. Thereafter, assets in 401(k)
accounts continue to grow, reaching about $137,000 in 2020, $226,000 in
2030, and $452,000 in 2040. Assuming historical rates of return less 300 ba-
sis points, average 401(k) assets reach the average PV of DB beneﬁts of all
persons in 2011 when both are about $66,000. Thereafter, assets in 401(k)
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4. These projections use actual annual pretax returns through 2005. Beginning in 2006, we
assume that the average annual nominal return on equities is 12 percent and that the average
nominal return on corporate bonds is 6 percent. Ibbotson Associates (2006) reports that the
historical arithmetic mean of pretax returns on long-term corporate bonds has been 6.2 per-
cent per year, while large-capitalization stocks have returned an average of 12.3 percent over
the period 1926 to 2005. These returns are the pretax total return available on a portfolio with
no management fees. We have not as yet accounted for asset management fees.
Fig. 10.17 Present value DB beneﬁts at age 65 and 401(k) assets at age 65, all per-
sons—Historical rates of returnFig. 10.18 Present value DB beneﬁts at age 65 and 401(k) assets at age 65, all per-
sons—Historical rates of return minus 300 basis points
Fig. 10.19 Present value of DB beneﬁts at age 65 for persons with a DB and
401(k) assets at age 65 for persons with a 401(k)—Historical rates of returnaccounts continue to grow, reaching about $104,000 in 2020, $149,000 in
2030, and $269,000 in 2040. The lower rate of return on equities substan-
tially reduces the accumulation of assets in 401(k) plans. Even with the
lower rate of return on equities, however, by 2040 the accumulation of as-
sets in 401(k) plans would be 3.7 times as large as the historical maximum
level of assets (fully funded) in DB plans, which was realized in 2003.
Figure 10.19 shows the present value of DB beneﬁts for persons who
have a DB plan and the 401(k) assets for persons who have a 401(k) plan,
assuming the average historical equity return. For these persons, balances
in 401(k) accounts reach the PV of DB beneﬁts in 2011, when both are
about $148,000. Thereafter, the 401(k) assets continue to grow, reaching
about $243,000 in 2020, $363,000 in 2030, and $580,000 in 2040. For per-
sons with DB plans, the average present value of beneﬁts also continues to
grow, reaching $187,000 by 2040. By 2040, the accumulation of 401(k) as-
sets is about 3 times the PV of DB assets. Figure 10.20 shows 401(k) assets
assuming that the rate of return on equities is 300 basis points lower than
the historical average. Here the assets of persons with 401(k) accounts
reach the level of the PV of DB beneﬁts for persons who receive beneﬁts in
2014, when both are about $145,000. Thereafter, the 401(k) assets continue
to grow, reaching about $185,000 in 2020, $241,000 in 2030, and $345,000
in 2040. For persons with DB plans, the average present value of beneﬁts
also continues to grow, reaching $187,000 by 2040. Thus, for persons with
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Fig. 10.20 Present value of DB beneﬁts at age 65 for persons with a DB and
401(k) assets at age 65 for persons with a 401(k)—Historical rates of return minus
300 basis pointsplans, by 2040 the accumulation in 401(k) plans is about 1.8 times the PV
of DB assets at sixty-ﬁve.
Our 401(k) asset projections do not account for legislated increases in
the contribution limits between 2003 and 2007. The limit increases are
large for all income groups, with the largest increases for persons with in-
comes between $15,000 and $20,000. Only a small proportion of persons
are currently contributing at the maximum. However, as incomes increase,
a larger and larger fraction of employees are likely to be contributing at the
new limits. For this reason, it is likely that future contributions to 401(k)
plans will be greater than our assumptions (projections) suggest. In addi-
tion, we have not accounted for the eﬀects of the Pension Protection Act of
2006, which gives employers latitude to set more “saving friendly” defaults
in 401(k) plans. Beshears et al. (2008) survey some of the recent evidence
on how changing defaults for enrollment, contribution rates, and asset al-
locations can signiﬁcantly increase retirement saving.
10.7 Assets in DB Trust Funds and Total DB Beneﬁts Paid
Finally, we want to estimate the level of total assets in DB trust funds.
These estimates are likely to be particularly important for assessing future
changes in the demand for ﬁnancial assets. We made similar calculations
with respect to 401(k) and other personal retirement account assets in
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2008). We believe the DB component, together
with the 401(k) component, represent a substantial fraction of the demog-
raphy-induced change in asset demand.
There are at least two general ways to predict future assets in DB plans.
One way is to predict total beneﬁts paid in future years and then to suppose
that assets in a year are suﬃcient to pay the present value of these future
obligations. We take this approach here. We believe, however, that this ap-
proach should yield fully funded current assets that are greater than actual
assets. A second way is to predict future assets based on an extrapolation
of current assets compared to fully funded liabilities. A possible extrapola-
tion procedure, for example, is to assume that assets will continue to be a
given percent below the fully funded level. We have not pursued this ap-
proach here.
To obtain the present value of future obligations, we must ﬁrst calculate
total DB beneﬁts paid each year. As described in the preceding, we have
projected the average level of DB beneﬁts of recipients by age and cohort
(or, alternatively, by age and calendar year). We have also projected the
conditional probability of receiving beneﬁts for each age and year. We now
combine these projections with demographic projections obtained from
the Social Security Administration to obtain total DB beneﬁts paid in each
year. More precisely, we calculate the total dollar value of DB beneﬁts paid
to all persons in year t as:




where N a,tis the number of persons age ain year t, P a,tis the probability that
beneﬁts are received by a person age a in year t, and Ba,t is the average ben-
eﬁt received (conditional on beneﬁt receipt) by a person of age a in year t.
Figure 10.21 shows these totals for the years 1982 to 2004, together with
a constructed series that sums together private-sector DB beneﬁts, beneﬁts
paid to federal employees, and beneﬁts paid to state and local employees.
The private-sector data are from the Form 5500 data and exclude beneﬁts
paid directly by insurance carriers. Federal DB beneﬁts include payments
made by the Civil Service Retirement System, the Federal Employees Re-
tirement System, and the Military Service Retirement System. Deﬁned
beneﬁt and DC beneﬁts are not reported separately for state and local
plans. The data used here include DC as well as DB beneﬁts. Thus, our pro-
jected DB beneﬁts should be somewhat smaller than sum of these reported
government and private-sector beneﬁts.
The projected totals are close to the constructed totals in the early years
but are smaller than the constructed totals in the later years. The discrep-
ancy is due in part at least to the growing importance of 401(k)-like ac-
counts in the state and local government plans. Thus, we believe that the
comparison lends credence to our estimates, based on SIPP data, for these
years. Our forward projections depend on the assumptions we have made
to project beneﬁt levels and beneﬁt receipt for future cohorts not repre-
sented in the SIPP data.
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Fig. 10.21 DB beneﬁts paid: Projected versus 5500 plus other sources, 1982 to 2004Our projected estimates of total DB beneﬁts in future years are shown in
ﬁgure 10.22 in year 2000 dollars. Total beneﬁts paid from DB plans con-
tinue to increase until 2027. The proﬁle turns down eventually because the
probability that beneﬁts are received (at age seventy) reaches a maximum
with the cohort that attains age sixty-ﬁve in 2007, although this cohort con-
tinues to receive beneﬁts after 2007. From a peak of $435,000 in 2027, the
real value of total beneﬁts paid declines modestly to $392,000 by 2040. As
noted in ﬁgures 10.17 to 10.20, the real level of beneﬁts increases through
the end of the projection period, so the decline in total beneﬁts in ﬁgure
10.22 is driven by the decline in the probability of beneﬁt receipt.
For comparison, projected beneﬁts paid from DB plans are graphed
against amounts withdrawn from 401(k) plans in ﬁgure 10.23.5 Beneﬁts
from DB plans exceed withdrawals of 401(k) assets until 2028, assuming
historical rates of equity returns. After 2028, the value of DB beneﬁts falls
each year, and 401(k) withdrawals increase rapidly thereafter. If the future
average rate of return on equities is assumed to be the average historical
rate less 300 basis points, the beneﬁts from DB plans exceed withdrawals
of 401(k) assets until 2034.
We use our projections of beneﬁts to be paid from DB plans to help to
project future assets in DB trust funds. Suppose that in each year assets
held by DB plan sponsors were equal to the present value of future obliga-
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Fig. 10.22 Projected DB beneﬁts paid: By year
5. The 401(k) withdrawals shown in this ﬁgure are projected amounts disbursed when ac-
count owners are alive and do not include balances that remain in accounts when account
owners die.tions. If future liabilities are discounted at 3 percent and ﬁrms have a
twenty-year planning horizon, the present value of liabilities each year is
shown in ﬁgure 10.24. The ﬁgure also shows two series representing re-
ported total assets in DB plans. The ﬁrst is from the ﬂow of funds accounts
that include private-sector DB plans and the value of assets in DB and DC
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Fig. 10.23 DB beneﬁts paid versus 401(k) withdrawals
Fig. 10.24 Present value of DB liabilities versus DB assetsplans for government sponsors. The second series is composed of private-
sector DB assets from Form 5500 reports, federal DB assets from various
federal agency annual reports, and the sum of DB and DC assets for state
and local governments from the Census Bureau’s series on state and local
government retirement systems. Actual assets, for the years they are avail-
able, are substantially below our calculation of the present value of liabili-
ties in all years, with the possible exception of 1999. But the gap between
actual assets and fully funded assets declined between 1985 and 1999. Dur-
ing this period, contributions to DB plans sometimes exceeded and some-
times fell short of the change in the present value of liabilities, as shown in
ﬁgure 10.25. The gap closed in the late 1990s largely because of the stock
market boom.
It is perhaps not surprising that actual assets are less than our estimates
of the assets employers would have to hold to fully fund projected liabili-
ties. Private-sector plan sponsors have substantial latitude in the assump-
tion of interest rates, investment returns, when beneﬁts will be paid, and
other features that determine funding levels.6 The former director of the
Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), Bradley Belt (2005), esti-
mated that private DB plans were underfunded by $450 billion in 2004.
There are even fewer restrictions on the funding of federal, state, and local
plans, and many are thought to be substantially underfunded.
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Fig. 10.25 Change in present value of future DB liabilities versus contributions
6. Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) discuss these issues in the context of earnings ma-
nipulation.Our fully funded method yields assets that are well above actual assets in
DB plans, at least in recent years. We know of no way to conﬁdently pre-
dict future funding levels, however. Thus, we have projected future assets
levels according to the fully funded method described in the preceding.
10.8 DB and 401(k) Assets Combined
What will be the change in asset levels for all pension plans—DB and
401(k) plans combined—in future years? The evolution of total assets de-
pends on three components: contributions, withdrawals, and the internal
buildup. In our prior work, we projected assets held in 401(k) plans. These
401(k) assets, DB plan liabilities (fully funded DB assets), and the sum of
both series are shown in ﬁgure 10.26 and 10.27, assuming historical equity
returns and historical returns minus 300 basis points, respectively. If equi-
ties in 401(k) plans earn the historical return, then 401(k) asset balances
overtake DB balances in 2009. If equities earn 300 basis points less than the
historical average, then 401(k) assets ﬁrst exceed DB assets in 2010.
We also consider total contributions to DB and 401(k) plans and total
withdrawals from DB and 401(k) plans. Figure 10.28 shows contributions
to 401(k) plans, the annual change in DB liabilities (a rough measure of
contributions to a fully funded DB plan), and the sum of these contribu-
tions. The sum is relatively ﬂat between 2000 and 2040. In contrast, the sum
of beneﬁts paid grows rapidly through 2040, especially if historical equity
rates of return are assumed. Withdrawals from 401(k) plans, DB beneﬁts
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Fig. 10.26 Projected assets: 401(k), DB, and combined—Historical equity rates
of return366 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise
Fig. 10.27 Projected assets: 401(k), DB, and combined—Historical equity return
minus 300 basis points
Fig. 10.28 Projected contributions: 401(k), DB (change in liabilities), and com-
bined—Historical equity returns
paid, and the sum of the two are shown in ﬁgure 10.29 using historical eq-
uity returns and ﬁgure 10.30 using the historical return less 300 basis
points.
Figure 10.31shows the total projected contributions to and withdrawals
from DB and 401(k) plans combined. Withdrawals assuming historical eq-Fig. 10.29 Projected withdrawals: 401(k), DB (beneﬁts paid), and combined—
Historical equity returns
Fig. 10.30 Projected withdrawals: 401(k), DB (beneﬁts paid), and combined—
Historical equity returns minus 300 basis pointsuity rates of return and withdrawals assuming the historical return minus
300 basis points are shown in the ﬁgure. Withdrawals exceed contributions
after 2020 and 2021 for these two withdrawal series, respectively. Figure
10.32 shows the combined withdrawals minus contributions. Again, with-
drawals exceed contributions after 2020 if historical equity rates of return
are assumed and after 2022 if historical rates minus 300 basis points are as-
sumed. The excess of withdrawals over contributions reaches about $872
billion by 2040 (in year 2000 dollars) when historical rates of return are as-
sumed but only about $353 billion if historical rates minus 300 basis points
are assumed. Because of internal buildup, however, under either equity re-
turn scenario total assets in pension plans continue to grow through 2040.
This is shown in ﬁgures 10.26 and 10.27.7
10.9 Demographically Sensitive Assets and Rates of Return
Whether demographically induced changes in DB and DC assets will
have an appreciable eﬀect on the rates of return on equities and other ﬁ-
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Fig. 10.31 Projected contributions and withdrawals: DB and 401(k) 
plans combined
7. Schieber and Shoven (1997) consider the implications of population aging for private
pension fund saving and project saving as a percent of payrolls. Their projection method is
very diﬀerent from ours, and it does not focus on the rising importance of self-directed DC
plans in the way that ours does. Nevertheless, their results are qualitatively similar to ours.
They project that total private pension withdrawals will exceed contributions beginning in
2024, reversing the pattern of earlier years.nancial assets depends on the magnitude of these changes relative to the
other components of asset demand. Other changes in asset demand may
reinforce or counterbalance them. Because asset markets are global, do-
mestic demand for ﬁnancial assets is not the only force determining the re-
turns on stocks and bonds in the United States. Several recent studies have
explored how demographic change in the currently developed world will
aﬀect global asset demand. Our estimates of the future demand for pen-
sion assets in the United States, if replicated in other countries, could be an
important input to such studies. Whether international capital ﬂows will
reinforce or moderate the demographic pressures on asset returns that may
arise from changes in the population age structure in the United States de-
pends critically on the future rate of development of currently young econ-
omies and on the age structure of other developed nations.
When evaluating how demographic change aﬀects the demand for ﬁ-
nancial assets in general, and speciﬁcally corporate equities, one must re-
member that a large fraction of ﬁnancial assets are owned by a small frac-
tion of the population. This group of high net worth investors is likely to be
less sensitive to age-related changes in asset demand than other investors
who have life-cycle motives for saving. Kennickell (2006) reports that in the
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, the wealthiest 5 percent of households
owned 65.6 percent of equities, including mutual funds, and 79.1 percent
of equities, excluding mutual funds. Pension assets represent a smaller
share of the assets of this group than of other less-aﬄuent sectors of the
population.
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Fig. 10.32 Projected withdrawals minus contributions: DB and 401(k) 
plans combinedRetirement plan assets are one of the most, if not the most, demograph-
ically sensitive components of the household ﬁnancial balance sheet.
There are clear demographic eﬀects on assets in DB plans, which are typi-
cally paid out as beneﬁt annuities at the time of retirement. The link be-
tween demographic structure and 401(k) plan assets is less mechanical
because older households have discretion over the rate at which they
draw down assets in retirement. There is uncertainty both about the date
atwhich withdrawals will begin and the rate of such withdrawals once they
start. At present, many 401(k) participants do not begin to make with-
drawals until they are required to do so at age 70.5. In the future, the aver-
age age of ﬁrst withdrawal is likely to increase even for those who do not
wait until 70.5 to begin withdrawals because the average age of retirement
is likely to rise. This is likely to result both from the increase in the normal
Social Security retirement age from sixty-ﬁve to sixty-seven by 2027, and
from the conversion from DB plans, with strong incentives to leave the la-
bor force early, to personal retirement accounts without these incentives.
Longer working lives will probably delay withdrawals from personal re-
tirement accounts and increase the accumulation of retirement assets.
For households that are constrained by the mandatory withdrawal re-
quirements from personal retirement accounts, withdrawals of DC plan
assets are likely to overstate the decline in asset demand at older ages. There
is no requirement that households consume their minimum distributions,
and households that would prefer not to make any withdrawals from their
401(k) plans or individual retirement accounts (IRAs) may simply reinvest
the mandatory payouts in other investment options. It is possible that such
households will bequeath a substantial portion of their tax-deferred assets
to their heirs, who may continue to accumulate assets in a tax-deferred set-
ting for many years. Recent legislation has facilitated such transfers of
personal retirement account assets. While this consideration suggests that
401(k) assets may remain substantial even for households at very advanced
ages, it is also possible that the ﬁnancial burden of health care in retirement
will be greater for future retirees than for past cohorts and that this will ne-
cessitate greater expenditures during retirement. If the cost of health care
continues to increase, future retirees are likely to spend more on health
care than current retirees. This could aﬀect not only the accumulation of
retirement assets, but could accelerate withdrawals from retirement ac-
counts as well.
The many uncertainties that arise in trying to link one source of asset de-
mand to equilibrium rates of return make us reluctant to attempt to quan-
tify the impact of demographically induced changes in retirement asset
accumulation on prospective stock or bond returns. There is also a
fundamental circularity in this question. Our projections of future DC as-
sets are based on assumptions about the rate of return that plan assets will
earn in the next few decades. This underscores the importance of consid-
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assumptions. This concern notwithstanding, we have developed one met-
ric to provide some indication of the quantitative importance of the demo-
graphically induced changes in retirement asset demand.
Figure 10.33shows our projected demand for all pension plan assets, in-
cluding both bonds and equities, as a percentage of the Social Security Ad-
ministration intermediate gross domestic product (GDP) projection. The
ﬁgure shows that pension assets grow from 50 percent of GDP in 1985 to
100 percent in 2010 to 179 percent in 2040. If the return on equity is 300
basis points lower than the historical return, then total pension assets grow
to about 120 percent of GDP by 2040. Both of these projections suggest a
very substantial increase retirement saving over the coming decades.
Figure 10.34 shows the projected demand for corporate equity in both
DB and DC plans as a percentage of the Social Security Administration in-
termediate GDP projection: one based on the historical equity rate of re-
turn and the other based on the historical return less 300 basis points.8His-
torically, pension equities grew from about 30 percent of GDP in 1985 to
about 55 percent in 2005. Our projections suggest continued growth be-
tween now and 2040, to 142 percent of GDP when the projection is based
on the historical equity return and 84 percent of GDP when the assumed
rate of return is the historical value minus 300 basis points. The shape of
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Fig. 10.33 Total pension assets as share of GDP—Historical return and historical
return minus 300 basis points
8. The equity share is based on projected accumulated equity assets, which depends on the
assumed rate of return on equities. We assume no rebalancing in 401(k) plans.the projected growth path is also aﬀected by the diﬀerent rate of return as-
sumptions. For example, the one-year growth rate of pension assets be-
tween 2039 and 2040 is 1.0 percent in the former case and –0.2 percent
when we assume the lower equity return. The ﬁgure shows that even when
we make the lower rate of return assumption, the stock of pension assets
continues to increase for the next three decades, even relative to the aggre-
gate economy. The projections do not suggest a sharp decline in pension
assets, either in absolute dollars or relative to GDP, when the baby boom
cohort reaches retirement age. If low returns depress the growth of 401(k)
assets, however, there may be some years in which total retirement assets as
a share of GDP are stable or decline slightly.
10.10 Summary
A key component to any eﬀort to analyze how demographic trends may
aﬀect future returns on ﬁnancial assets is a careful analysis of how these
trends will aﬀect assets in DB and DC pension plans. This chapter on DB
pension plan assets and our earlier companion paper on 401(k) assets ex-
plore this issue. The dramatic decline in DB participation in the past three
decades stands in contrast to the rapid expansion of 401(k)-like plans. We
develop projections of the DB beneﬁts of cohorts retiring between now and
2040 and use them to project the total assets held in DB plans through
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Fig. 10.34 Pension equity as share of GDP—Historical return and historical re-
turn minus 300 basis points2040. The projections are based on extrapolation of cohort data from many
waves of the SIPP along with demographic projections from the Social Se-
curity Administration.
We project the present value of DB beneﬁts at age sixty-ﬁve for cohorts
who reach age sixty-ﬁve in each year from 1982 to 2040, and we compare
these projections to projections of 401(k) assets. Our projections suggest
that the average (over all persons) of the present value of real DB beneﬁts
at age sixty-ﬁve attained an historical maximum in 2003, when the value
was $72,637. Our projections also suggest that the average value of 401(k)
assets at age sixty-ﬁve surpasses the average present value of DB beneﬁts at
age sixty-ﬁve in about 2010. Thereafter, the value of 401(k) assets grows
rapidly, attaining levels much greater than the maximum present value of
DB beneﬁts. If equity returns between 2006 and 2040 are comparable to
those observed historically, by 2040 average projected 401(k) assets will be
over six times larger than the historical maximum level of DB beneﬁts at
age sixty-ﬁve, attained in 2003. Even if equity returns average 300 basis
points below their historical value, we project that average 401(k) assets in
2040 would be 3.7 times as large as the value of DB beneﬁts in 2003.
The projected growth of real 401(k) assets more than oﬀsets the pro-
jected decline in real DB plan assets during the next three decades. Focus-
ing on DB assets alone suggests that an aging population, in conjunction
with a shift away from DB plans, will lead to a decline in the real value of
pension assets averaged across all retirees in future cohorts. When we com-
bine projected 401(k) assets with projected DB assets, however, we ﬁnd that
real pension assets not only increase, but increase substantially, in future
decades.
Our ﬁndings underscore the need for further analysis of the factors that
determine the diﬀusion of 401(k) plans across corporations, especially
small companies with low-wage workers, as well as the contribution be-
havior and withdrawal behavior of 401(k) participants. The growing role
of 401(k)-type plans in the retirement landscape suggests that understand-
ing asset accumulation and draw-down in these plans is a critical compo-
nent of any analysis of the eﬀect of demographic change on ﬁnancial mar-
kets.
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Age in 1984 Year age 65 Coeﬃcient error t-statistic
86 1963 41.84 59.67 0.70
85 1964  22.90 75.76  0.30
83 1966  42.08 50.39  0.84
82 1967 27.12 55.60 0.49
81 1968 110.47 62.20 1.78
80 1969 55.35 68.64 0.81
79 1970 132.11 59.10 2.24
78 1971 206.22 55.86 3.69
77 1972 156.01 53.63 2.91
76 1973 151.60 50.57 3.00
75 1974 171.49 51.14 3.35
74 1975 246.42 48.08 5.12
73 1976 232.83 51.14 4.55
72 1977 264.87 48.86 5.42
71 1978 312.69 51.26 6.10
70 1979 328.91 50.51 6.51
69 1980 352.85 49.27 7.16
68 1981 410.67 49.83 8.24
67 1982 479.79 48.30 9.93
66 1983 496.66 49.11 10.11
65 1984 526.01 49.72 10.58
64 1985 548.35 50.30 10.90
63 1986 589.81 49.88 11.83
62 1987 592.74 49.54 11.97
61 1988 607.28 50.00 12.15
60 1989 657.08 50.77 12.94
59 1990 685.37 51.76 13.24
58 1991 748.48 53.73 13.93
57 1992 710.96 51.80 13.73
56 1993 815.37 53.83 15.15
55 1994 815.87 53.67 15.20
54 1995 911.54 55.21 16.51
53 1996 883.43 55.71 15.86
52 1997 983.28 58.73 16.74
51 1998 1,009.20 60.24 16.75
50 1999 1,063.51 60.98 17.44
49 2000 1,079.51 61.99 17.41
48 2001 1,124.29 63.02 17.84
47 2002 1,299.43 71.18 18.25
46 2003 1,407.14 71.53 19.67
45 2004 1,381.55 77.27 17.88
44 2005 1,364.24 75.67 18.03




Age in 1984 Year age 65 Coeﬃcient error t-statistic
42 2007 1,452.48 83.95 17.30
41 2008 1,516.71 84.13 18.03
40 2009 1,652.97 114.61 14.42
39 2010 1,658.59 116.33 14.26
38 2011 1,720.02 123.20 13.96
37 2012 1,729.32 127.80 13.53
Intercept Age  131.08 54.89  2.39
55–60 52.53 7.38 7.11
60–65  13.07 5.73  2.28
65–70 10.55 4.29 2.46
70–75 17.93 4.20 4.27
75–80 16.91 4.85 3.49
  80 0.92 5.84 0.16




Note: MSE   mean square error.




Age in 1984 Year age 65 Coeﬃcient error t-statistic
80 1969 0.20 0.14 1.43
79 1970 0.14 0.13 1.11
78 1971 0.17 0.12 1.40
77 1972 0.13 0.12 1.09
76 1973 0.19 0.12 1.60
75 1974 0.20 0.12 1.65
74 1975 0.10 0.12 0.83
73 1976 0.21 0.12 1.84
72 1977 0.29 0.11 2.66
71 1978 0.34 0.11 3.04
70 1979 0.24 0.11 2.17
69 1980 0.32 0.11 2.93
68 1981 0.37 0.11 3.38
67 1982 0.41 0.11 3.77
66 1983 0.45 0.11 4.17





Age in 1984 Year age 65 Coeﬃcient error t-statistic
64 1985 0.40 0.11 3.68
63 1986 0.43 0.11 3.98
62 1987 0.44 0.11 4.09
61 1988 0.42 0.11 3.92
60 1989 0.46 0.11 4.28
59 1990 0.43 0.11 3.98
58 1991 0.43 0.11 3.95
57 1992 0.42 0.11 3.85
56 1993 0.42 0.11 3.91
55 1994 0.44 0.11 4.01
54 1995 0.43 0.11 3.94
53 1996 0.43 0.11 3.95
52 1997 0.43 0.11 3.91
51 1998 0.43 0.11 3.91
50 1999 0.52 0.11 4.71
49 2000 0.43 0.11 3.94
48 2001 0.41 0.11 3.74
47 2002 0.41 0.11 3.73
46 2003 0.46 0.11 4.07
45 2004 0.49 0.11 4.36
44 2005 0.46 0.11 4.00
43 2006 0.55 0.11 4.80
42 2007 0.51 0.11 4.51
41 2008 0.58 0.12 4.78
40 2009 0.60 0.12 4.95
39 2010 0.54 0.12 4.41
38 2011 0.61 0.12 4.94
37 2012 0.47 0.12 3.82
Intercept Age  6.94 0.38  18.31
55–60 0.10 0.01 15.45
60–65 0.11 0.00 23.08
65–70 0.03 0.00 5.25
70–75 0.01 0.01 1.78
75–80 0.00 0.01 0.01
No. of observations 78,686
Pseudo R2 0.0593




Age in 1984 Year age 65 Coeﬃcient error t-statistic
65 1984  0.143 0.122  1.17
64 1985  0.064 0.107  0.59
63 1986  0.083 0.105  0.79
62 1987 0.046 0.092 0.51
60 1989 0.056 0.091 0.62
59 1990 0.040 0.091 0.44
58 1991 0.010 0.094 0.11
57 1992 0.139 0.094 1.48
56 1993  0.040 0.098  0.40
55 1994  0.025 0.095  0.26
54 1995  0.031 0.096  0.32
53 1996  0.247 0.096  2.56
52 1997  0.160 0.096  1.67
51 1998  0.177 0.090  1.98
50 1999  0.227 0.087  2.62
49 2000  0.249 0.084  2.95
48 2001  0.124 0.081  1.52
47 2002  0.173 0.080  2.17
46 2003  0.198 0.078  2.52
45 2004  0.290 0.079  3.65
44 2005  0.225 0.078  2.88
43 2006  0.160 0.077  2.07
42 2007  0.202 0.077  2.63
41 2008  0.232 0.078  2.99
40 2009  0.257 0.078  3.31
39 2010  0.241 0.078  3.09
38 2011  0.230 0.077  2.97
37 2012  0.259 0.078  3.31
36 2013  0.327 0.078  4.18
35 2014  0.313 0.078  4.02
34 2015  0.358 0.077  4.62
33 2016  0.410 0.077  5.29
32 2017  0.419 0.077  5.44
31 2018  0.486 0.077  6.31
30 2019  0.485 0.077  6.31
29 2020  0.519 0.077  6.76
28 2021  0.525 0.077  6.84
27 2022  0.543 0.077  7.05
26 2023  0.526 0.077  6.82
25 2024  0.586 0.078  7.47
24 2025  0.530 0.078  6.76
23 2026  0.618 0.079  7.81
22 2027  0.640 0.080  8.03
21 2028  0.610 0.079  7.68
20 2029  0.631 0.080  7.91
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Comment Jonathan Skinner
Everyone knows that the United States is embarking on a fundamental de-
mographic shift as the baby boomers age, but there’s less agreement on how
it will aﬀect the ﬁnancial security of future retirees. James M. Poterba,
Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise (2007b) have provided some critical an-
swers to this larger question by charting the course of deﬁned beneﬁt plans
and their future inﬂows and outﬂows. The chapter is remarkable not because
the results are shocking—indeed, they appear quite reasonable—but be-
cause of the incredible attention to detail in building up from the micro-
level patterns of data to aggregate predictions. By harnessing millions of
individual-level observations from a variety of sources and years, they not
only provide a solid foundation for the aggregate estimates, but they also
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